ACCA F5 試題解析：轉(zhuǎn)移定價(jià)(transfer price)（二）

轉(zhuǎn)移定價(jià)(transfer price)知識(shí)點(diǎn)在ACCA歷年考試中頻率很高。一般來說，簡(jiǎn)單的考核方式會(huì)給出一些條件讓考生判斷產(chǎn)品的外部需求是否已經(jīng)滿足，工廠是否已經(jīng)滿負(fù)荷運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)，這些情況下應(yīng)該選用可變成本還是市場(chǎng)價(jià)格來定價(jià)。做這類題目的時(shí)候需要從集團(tuán)利益的角度的出發(fā)，考慮部門之間應(yīng)該采取內(nèi)部購銷還是各自從外部購入或?qū)ν怃N售?？傊?，做出的決策和制定的價(jià)格既要滿足集團(tuán)的利益又不能影響各部門的績(jī)效考評(píng)。下面我們來看一下2011年12月Q2這道例題，雖然年份比較久遠(yuǎn)，但是非常經(jīng)典，難度也比較大，可以說考出了F5績(jī)效管理的精髓。

（接 ACCA F5 試題解析：轉(zhuǎn)移定價(jià)(transfer price)（一） ）

Workings ($’000)

(1) External sales

Div A: 80,000 x $450 = $36,000

Div B: 180,000 x $80 = $14,400

(2) Internal sales/inter-divisional transfers

Div B:20,000 x $65 = $1,300

(3) Material costs

Div A: 60,000 x $265 + (20,000 x $200) = $19,900

Div B: 200,000 x $5 = $1,000

A transfer price of $65 has been used on the assumption that the company will introduce the policy discussed in (c).

Provided that the transfer price is set between the minimum of $20 (Division B’s marginal cost) and $65 (the cost to Division A of buying from outside the group), the actual transfer price is irrelevant in this calculation. The overall profit of the company will be the same.

（b）問需要考慮什么樣的轉(zhuǎn)移政策是至優(yōu)的，所有的采購和銷售行為需要從整個(gè)集團(tuán)的角度出發(fā)。部門B總產(chǎn)能200,000單位，對(duì)外比對(duì)內(nèi)銷售賺取的收入更多。從集團(tuán)利益出發(fā)選擇優(yōu)先對(duì)外銷售180,000, 剩余20,000閑置產(chǎn)能，本著避免內(nèi)部資源浪費(fèi)的原則，需要將其出售給部門A。A的需求是80,000單位，剩下60,000選擇從外部購置。但是A部門經(jīng)理更傾向外部采購，因?yàn)橹恍枰Ц冻杀?5美元，低于內(nèi)部轉(zhuǎn)移價(jià)格75美元，這個(gè)時(shí)候需要調(diào)整一下transfer price來平衡雙方的利益。B生產(chǎn)的原材料可變成本包括原材料5美元和人工成本15美元，內(nèi)部轉(zhuǎn)移的至優(yōu)定價(jià)應(yīng)該控制在可變成本和市場(chǎng)價(jià)格之間，即20美元到65美元。從集團(tuán)出發(fā)，選擇20還是65沒有區(qū)別，因?yàn)橹两K編制合并報(bào)表的時(shí)候收入成本全部抵消。但是評(píng)估各部門績(jī)效的時(shí)候會(huì)優(yōu)先選擇定價(jià)65，對(duì)A來說不論內(nèi)部轉(zhuǎn)移還是外部購買都要花費(fèi)65美元，對(duì)于B來說，它用的閑置產(chǎn)能，只要能夠彌補(bǔ)可變成本即可，定價(jià)65美元還可以獲取一定金額的貢獻(xiàn)，這也是B部門愿意看到的結(jié)果。

對(duì)比(a)和(b)問的結(jié)果我們可以看出選擇65美元的內(nèi)部轉(zhuǎn)移價(jià)格集團(tuán)可以獲取更多的利潤(rùn)。

(c) Issues and suitable transfer price

Divisional managers’ performance is assessed using a metric as decided by the company. This may simply be the profit for the period, or, depending on the type of responsibility centre being used, a metric such as residual income or return on capital employed. Whatever the metric being used, the division’s profit figure is going to affect it and divisional managers are therefore going to be keen to maximise their individual profits. By focusing on individual decisions, divisional managers are often not aware of the impact of their decisions on the company as a whole. This would particularly be the case where a decision which is in the best interests of the company actually makes an individual division’s performance look worse.

The transfer pricing system in place needs to take into account the behavioural impact of the prices being charged. Sometimes, this can mean that a ‘dual transfer pricing system’ needs to be introduced in order to ensure that divisional managers act in the interests of the company as a whole.

It can be seen from part (b) that the best decision for the company is that:

– Division A buys 60,000 sets of fittings from an outside supplier and buys the remaining 20,000 sets of fittings from Division B in order to ensure that Division B is working to full capacity.

– Division B sells as many sets of fittings as possible externally, at $80 per set. Since the maximum external demand is 180,000 units, Division B sells the remaining 20,000 sets of fittings to Division A. The minimum transfer price that would be acceptable to Division B is its marginal cost of $20 per unit, since it has spare capacity. However, if this transfer price is used, Division B becomes worse off than before the autonomy was given, and Division B’s manager will not like this. As far as Division A is concerned, it will not want to pay more than the $65 that it can buy from outside the group.

Bath Co’s policy therefore needs to ensure that, firstly, Division A’s manager is prepared to buy 20,000 sets of fittings from Division B and secondly, Division B is prepared to sell them at $65 per set. Since it is in Division B’s best interest to work to full capacity and the manager of Division B knows that Division A can obtain fittings for $65 per set, it should not be difficult for B to agree to sell to A at this price. A policy of negotiated transfer prices would achieve this fairly quickly. However, the company also needs to have a policy that divisions buy internally first, where this would be in the best interests of the overall profitability of the company. This would ensure that Division A buys the 20,000 sets of fittings from Division B. This way, the overall profit of the company is maximised whilst also ensuring that divisional managers do not become demotivated.

對(duì)部門經(jīng)理進(jìn)行績(jī)效考評(píng)的時(shí)候會(huì)基于一些利潤(rùn)指標(biāo)，比如RI和ROI，可能會(huì)出現(xiàn)一些不合理的情況，比如dysfunctional。題目中提到A經(jīng)理如果有自主權(quán)會(huì)更傾向于外部采購，但是從集團(tuán)的利益出發(fā)，需要先消化掉B部門的剩余產(chǎn)能，如果按照75元定價(jià)則對(duì)A不公平，所以倒計(jì)時(shí)定價(jià)為65美元。

制定轉(zhuǎn)移價(jià)格時(shí)候還可以采用一種更高級(jí)的方法“dual pricing”。這時(shí)候需要引入Bath集團(tuán)公司。B可以以80美元的價(jià)格先賣給Bath，Bath再賣給A的時(shí)候售價(jià)20，差額60可以在集團(tuán)賬上記成一筆費(fèi)用，這樣是比較公平的方式。

大家在復(fù)習(xí)transfer price知識(shí)點(diǎn)的時(shí)候可以參考本題和2015年6月Q2，通過做題有助于加深對(duì)這部分的理解。倒計(jì)時(shí)，希望大家都能夠順利通過ACCA考試。

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