Goldman Sachs, the investment bank, began courting the Agricultural Bank of China five years ago in the hope of winning the mandate to help the large state bank go public last July, bringing over senior executives from New York and Hong Kong to woo AgBank officials.

　　投資銀行高盛(Goldman Sachs)為了在中國農(nóng)業(yè)銀行(Agricultural Bank of China)去年7月上市時(shí)贏得承銷商授權(quán)，五年前就開始對農(nóng)行展開追逐，常駐紐約和香港的高管紛紛趕來與農(nóng)行官員接觸。

　　“How much does it cost to bring [Goldman Sachs chief executive] Lloyd Blankfein to Beijing?” asks the head of one of the bank’s competitors rhetorically. “That is why you can never quantify the fees versus the costs of doing business in China. So much goes into winning deals that you are never reimbursed for. You can’t be too granular about the costs versus the benefits.”

　　“把（高盛CEO）勞爾德?貝蘭克梵(Lloyd Blankfein)請到北京得花多少錢呀？”一家競爭對手的負(fù)責(zé)人設(shè)問。“所以說，在中國做生意的傭金與成本都是不能量化的。要想贏得生意就要作出很多不可能收回的投入，對于成本與收益不能計(jì)較得太細(xì)致。”

　　Chinese equity fees now account for up to 40-50 per cent of all Asia-Pacific fees. But a growing list of banks competing for the business, Chinese leverage in browbeating banks to cut their prices, and the expense of recruiting and keeping China bankers mean that the profitability of doing business there will remain under pressure.

　　中國股本相關(guān)業(yè)務(wù)的傭金現(xiàn)在占亞太地區(qū)總傭金的40%到50%。然而由于參與業(yè)務(wù)競爭的銀行越來越多、中國企業(yè)迫使銀行壓低價(jià)格、招募和保留中國銀行家也需要成本，因此這塊業(yè)務(wù)的盈利能力會繼續(xù)承受壓力。

　　“Fees are never as good as they are in Europe or the US,” says the head of mergers and acquisitions for one international bank in Hong Kong.

　　一家國際銀行在香港的并購主管說：“傭金從來沒有歐洲或美國那么高。”

　　Certainly, the data providers offer a positive picture. “China market fees are growing rapidly,” notes Thomson Reuters. “They have increased to 7 per cent of the global fee pool in 2010, up from 1 per cent in 2005. Total market fees were $5.8bn.”

　　當(dāng)然，數(shù)據(jù)提供商展現(xiàn)的圖景頗為積極。“中國市場的傭金快速增長，”湯森路透(Thomson Reuters)稱。“占全球傭金總額的比例已從2005年的1%，提高至2010年的7%。市場傭金總額58億美元。”

　　However, those fees are being swallowed up by an ever-growing list of banks. While consolidation is the big theme in the financial markets of New York and London, in China the number of banks competing for a role especially in capital markets deals grows ever larger and the competition more intense.

　　然而這些收入在被越來越多的銀行瓜分。在整合在紐約和倫敦成為金融市場的一大主題之際，在中國，參與競爭資本市場交易的銀行越來越多，競爭也越來越激烈。

　　That is true both internationally and locally, and more and more of those fees are going to China. Indeed, the country’s banks last year received 66 per cent of the total fees, while 13 of the top 20 banks doing business in the country today are Chinese, according to Thomson Reuters. Some, such as CICC, are experienced players. But others, such as the securities arms of the banks, get deals because of their more powerful parents.

　　無論在國際還是國內(nèi)層面都是如此，而且越來越多的傭金流向中國機(jī)構(gòu)。的確，湯森路透數(shù)據(jù)顯示，去年總傭金收入的66%流向中資銀行，而目前在中國經(jīng)營的規(guī)模最大的20家銀行中有13家是中資銀行。其中一些有豐富的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，如中金公司(CICC)，而另一些機(jī)構(gòu)（如銀行的證券部門）贏得業(yè)務(wù)靠的是更為強(qiáng)大的母公司。

　　Thus among those whose names appeared in the underwriting group for Agricultural Bank of China’s global offer was (of course) ABC International, the securities arm of AgBank, while ICBC International was part of the AIA Group listing. Unsurprisingly, the fees for AIA, the insurer, were far more lucrative than for AgBank, bankers add, precisely because of Chinese browbeating on fees.

　　因此，農(nóng)行的證券業(yè)務(wù)部門——農(nóng)銀國際(ABC International)的名字當(dāng)然就出現(xiàn)在農(nóng)銀全球IPO的承銷團(tuán)當(dāng)中，而工銀國際(ICBC International)參與了友邦保險(xiǎn)(AIA Group)的上市。并不意外的是，據(jù)銀行家們介紹，友邦保險(xiǎn)的傭金遠(yuǎn)比農(nóng)行更為豐厚，原因正是中國壓低傭金。

　　Moreover, the cost of the country’s bankers remains high, and competition for the best is intense. In the US, an experienced mergers banker has 20 years of experience, compared with about five years in China. But private equity and the growing number of banks doing business in China are all competing for the best talent, leading to the phenomenon of “serial traders” who constantly auction themselves off to the highest bidder.

　　 除此之外，中國銀行業(yè)的人才成本仍然很高，爭奪最能干銀行家的競爭很激烈。在美國，經(jīng)驗(yàn)豐富的并購銀行家會有20多年從業(yè)經(jīng)驗(yàn)，而在中國大約只有5年。然而在中國經(jīng)營的銀行越來越多，他們和私募基金一起爭奪最好的人才，甚至出現(xiàn)了一種不斷把自己拍賣給出價(jià)最高的銀行的“連環(huán)跳”現(xiàn)象。

　　This year, the volume of capital raising continues to be strong. Core investment banking revenues in China climbed to almost $1bn for the year to mid-March, which is the highest to date, with two-thirds of that coming from equity capital markets activity.

　　今年，資本融資總量繼續(xù)保持強(qiáng)勁。核心投行業(yè)務(wù)在中國的收入到3月中旬幾乎已經(jīng)攀升至10億美元，是迄今為止的最高水平，其中三分之二來自股票資本市場活動(dòng)。

　　But bankers say that to generalise about deal fees remains perilous. The entire structure is opaque and the data are often unreliable. Neither the bankers who win the mandates nor their clients disclose the fees, while both those involved and those who lost out have a vested interest in distorting the true figure. Many denounce competitors for allegedly slashing fees, although when a deal is deemed strategic, virtually every firm will reduce the rate.

　　不過銀行業(yè)者表示，對交易傭金進(jìn)行概括仍然十分危險(xiǎn)。傭金的整體結(jié)構(gòu)不透明，而且數(shù)據(jù)經(jīng)常并不可靠。無論是贏得業(yè)務(wù)的銀行還是客戶，都不會透露傭金金額。況且無論是否贏得業(yè)務(wù)，各銀行都有扭曲數(shù)字的動(dòng)機(jī)。許多投行會譴責(zé)競爭對手據(jù)稱削減傭金的行為，然而如果認(rèn)為某一單交易具有戰(zhàn)略意義，幾乎每一家都會降低費(fèi)用。

　　In any case, fees for equity raisings are far more lucrative for the numerous Chinese bankers who have been recruited and cosseted by the big international banks in Hong Kong, Shanghai and Beijing than fees for M&A. Indeed, one banker estimates that if the Chinese bankers were forced to live by M&A fees alone, they would all shrink their teams by 75 per cent.

　　無論如何，對位于香港、上海和北京的大型跨國銀行高薪招募的大量中國銀行家來說，股本集資業(yè)務(wù)的傭金收入遠(yuǎn)比并購更優(yōu)厚。的確，一位銀行家估計(jì)，如果中國銀行家被迫僅靠并購費(fèi)用為生，所有的團(tuán)隊(duì)都要把規(guī)?？s減75%。

　　Chinese cross-border acquisitions are also up this year, although the deals still lag behind 2008, the record year. But while China-related merger deals increase every year, arguably the glass remains more half empty than half full.

　　中國的跨國收購今年也出現(xiàn)增長，不過交易規(guī)模仍落后于達(dá)到最高紀(jì)錄的2008年水平。雖然中國相關(guān)的并購交易每年都會上升，但是仍然可以說杯子是半空的，而不是半滿的。

　　“If you have a company to sell and a potential Chinese buyer, it doesn’t always work,” says the head of M&A for one big US bank in Hong Kong. “It is disappointing how often the Chinese don’t deliver.”

　　“如果你想出售一家公司，同時(shí)有一個(gè)中國潛在買家，交易并不總能成功，”一家美國大銀行在香港的并購業(yè)務(wù)負(fù)責(zé)人表示。“中國方面經(jīng)常不履行承諾，讓人失望。”

　　Perhaps the most striking thing about M&A in China is how many deals that are expected to happen ultimately do not take place, making the process frustrating and the pay-out at the end questionable.

　　中國并購最引人注目的事實(shí)可能是，許多預(yù)期能夠敲定的交易最終不了了之，使整個(gè)過程充滿挫敗感，最終收費(fèi)也成問題。

　　Take Bright Food, an ambitious Chinese conglomerate whose name has been linked with GNC, the US vitamin and nutritional food maker, the UK’s United Biscuits and most recently Yoplait, the yoghurt maker jointly owned by France’s PAI and a French co-operative. While the fate of this last potential deal has not yet been resolved, the two former flirtations never led to marriage, leaving many bankers to conclude that this is a nation whose companies “are not ready for prime time”, as one China lawyer notes.

　　以光明食品(Bright Food)為例。這家雄心遠(yuǎn)大的中國企業(yè)集團(tuán)曾與多家外國公司有過并購傳聞，包括美國維生素和營養(yǎng)品制造商GNC、英國聯(lián)合餅干公司(United Biscuits)，以及最近的法國酸奶制造商Yoplait。Yoplait由法國PAI和一家法國農(nóng)業(yè)合作社共同擁有。雖然這最后一筆潛在交易的命運(yùn)還沒有確定，但前兩次試探都未能修成正果。按一位中國律師的說法，這讓許多銀行家得出結(jié)論認(rèn)為，中國企業(yè)“還沒有為黃金時(shí)間做好準(zhǔn)備”。

　　The GNC deal made a lot of sense for Bright Food, given Chinese people’s predilection for health foods and herbs. Ultimately, though, it fell apart on disagreements including pricing and funding uncertainties, according to people familiar with the matter. But from the beginning it was never clear whether the deal had the support of Beijing, which is often essential.

　　鑒于中國人對保健食品和草藥的偏愛，光明食品并購GNC顯得十分合理，然而最終還是不了了之。據(jù)知情人士透露，原因是對報(bào)價(jià)和不確定的籌資方式存在分歧。不過從一開始就不清楚這筆交易是否得到北京方面的支持，而這一點(diǎn)經(jīng)常十分重要。

　　Meanwhile, Bright Food’s interest in United Biscuits made little sense, according to bankers.

　　與此同時(shí)，銀行業(yè)者表示，光明食品對聯(lián)合餅干的興趣幾乎毫無道理。

　　“They were considered the preferred bidders on United Biscuits but it was hard to figure out why they wanted it, apart from ego,” says one banker. “It wasn’t clear why they wanted to buy a European brand and operations with nothing in Asia. It wasn’t clear how they would manage it and whether it would even appeal to the Chinese.”

　　“他們被視為聯(lián)合餅干的優(yōu)先競購者，不過很難搞懂除了虛榮之外，他們收購聯(lián)合餅干還能有什么原因，”一位銀行業(yè)者評價(jià)。“不清楚為什么他們要收購在亞洲一無所有的歐洲品牌和企業(yè)，也不清楚他們會怎樣管理，甚至中國人會不會喜歡。”

　　Resistance to paying fees continues to remain strong. “It is only when bankers create a deal or when a deal is outside their comfort zone that they will pay,” says one Hong Kong-based lawyer.

　　不愿支付傭金的心理仍然很強(qiáng)。一位駐在香港的律師表示：“只有當(dāng)一樁交易是銀行創(chuàng)造出的，或這筆交易超出了他們熟悉的范疇，他們才愿意付錢。”

　　International bankers spend much of their time trying to train their Chinese clients to understand the difference between what is value-added advice and what is not. But it is not clear whether the foreign bankers will be the ultimate beneficiaries or if their Chinese counterparts will reap the rewards.

　　跨國銀行家們花費(fèi)大量的時(shí)間，試圖讓中國客戶理解有價(jià)值的建議和沒有價(jià)值的建議之間有何區(qū)別。然而并不清楚最終受益者會是外國銀行家，還是他們的中國同行。