The relationship between Beijing and Tripoli during the 42-year reign of Col. Moammar Gadhafi included a narrative of brothers-in-arms solidarity and plenty of anti-imperialism rhetoric. But now that it appears to be ending, that relationship looks like it was more delicate than most realize.

　　宣揚(yáng)戰(zhàn)友一般的團(tuán)結(jié)，并經(jīng)常鼓吹反對(duì)帝國(guó)主義，是卡扎菲(Moammar Gadhafi)當(dāng)政42年期間，北京與的黎波里關(guān)系的一部分內(nèi)容。但在這一切似乎都將成為過(guò)去的時(shí)候來(lái)看，當(dāng)初兩國(guó)關(guān)系顯得比多數(shù)人所想的更加微妙。

　　In recent years, the Libyan regime clashed with the Chinese on everything from the rising power’s inroads into Africa to Col. Gadhafi’s economic and political ties with Taiwan. China, which is scouring the world for resources to feed its economy, saw its crude imports from Libya more than double since 2008. But its state-owned oil companies seemed to lack the needed political capital with the Gadhafi regime to gain significant stakes in crude-oil assets in Libya, home to Africa’s largest proven oil reserves.

　　最近幾年，利比亞當(dāng)局與中國(guó)政府在各種各樣的事情上發(fā)生沖突，沖突焦點(diǎn)既有中國(guó)這個(gè)崛起中大國(guó)在非洲的深入，也有卡扎菲與臺(tái)灣的政治經(jīng)濟(jì)聯(lián)系。中國(guó)正在世界各地尋找資源用于自己的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展，它從利比亞進(jìn)口的原油已經(jīng)達(dá)到2008年的兩倍多。但其國(guó)有石油公司在卡扎菲政權(quán)那里似乎缺少政治資本，無(wú)法在利比亞原油資產(chǎn)中獲得重大利益。利比亞擁有非洲最大的已探明石油儲(chǔ)備。

　　Col. Gadhafi’s anti-imperial diatribes were no doubt warmly received by at least some in Beijing. When fighting picked up this year and Col. Gadhafi appeared under increasing pressure from rebel and NATO bombardment, China initially stood by the Libyan strongman. Beijing’s fear of the spread of political unrest, which engulfed much of the Arab world in recent months, seemed to outweigh its often public political differences with Col. Gadhafi’s regime.

　　卡扎菲抨擊帝國(guó)主義的言論無(wú)疑是受到北京方面至少一部分人的熱烈歡迎。在今年戰(zhàn)事日趨激烈、反對(duì)派以及北約轟炸行動(dòng)給卡扎菲造成的壓力似乎越來(lái)越大的時(shí)候，中國(guó)最初是站在了卡扎菲一邊。雖然與卡扎菲政權(quán)存在政治上的分歧，并且常常是公開的分歧，但北京也擔(dān)心近幾個(gè)月席卷阿拉伯世界大片地區(qū)的政治動(dòng)蕩蔓延開來(lái)，這方面的擔(dān)心似乎占了上風(fēng)。

　　Those differences were varied. In 2006, for example, Libya hosted Taiwan’s then-President Chen Shui-bian, despite loud objections from Beijing. Col. Gadhafi’s son, Saif Gadhafi, himself had visited Taiwan earlier in the year.

　　雙方有著各種各樣的分歧。比如在2006年，利比亞不顧北京的強(qiáng)烈反對(duì)，仍然接待了臺(tái)灣時(shí)任總統(tǒng)陳水扁?？ㄔ频膬鹤淤惲x夫(Saif Gadhafi)還曾在今年早些時(shí)候親自到訪臺(tái)灣。

　　Taiwan in 2008 would open a trade office in Tripoli, even as Beijing warned that ties between Taiwan and Libya undermined the Gadhafi government’s relationship with China. Then, in 2009, even as Libya was selling increasing amounts of its oil to China, Libyan Foreign Minister Moussa Kusa in an interview with the influential Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper argued that China’s involvement in Africa reached far beyond normal economic cooperation. The anti-imperial rhetoric long a staple of the Gadhafi regime appeared to be targeting China.

　　2008年，就在北京警告臺(tái)灣與利比亞關(guān)系不利于卡扎菲政權(quán)與中國(guó)關(guān)系的時(shí)候，臺(tái)灣要在的黎波里開辦一個(gè)貿(mào)易代表處。然后在2009年，就在利比亞向中國(guó)出口石油越來(lái)越多的時(shí)候，利比亞外交部長(zhǎng)庫(kù)薩(Moussa Kusa)接受有著巨大影響的報(bào)紙Asharq Al-Awsat采訪，說(shuō)中國(guó)深入非洲遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)不止于正常的經(jīng)濟(jì)合作。卡扎菲政權(quán)長(zhǎng)期鼓吹的反帝言論，似乎把矛頭對(duì)準(zhǔn)了中國(guó)。

　　“When we look at the reality on the ground we find that there is something akin to a Chinese invasion of the African continent,” the foreign minister said. “This is something that brings to mind the effects that colonialism had on the African continent.”

　　庫(kù)薩說(shuō)，在現(xiàn)實(shí)世界中，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)有些東西像是中國(guó)在入侵非洲大陸；它讓人想起過(guò)去殖民主義給非洲大陸帶來(lái)的影響。

　　Also in 2009, the Gadhafi regime blocked the sale of a small Canadian oil company, Verenex Energy Inc., to state-owned China National Petroleum Corp., a significant hiccup in boosting economic ties between the countries.

　　同樣是在2009年，卡扎菲政權(quán)阻撓國(guó)有企業(yè)中國(guó)石油天然氣集團(tuán)公司收購(gòu)加拿大一家小型石油公司Verenex Energy Inc.。這對(duì)于兩國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)關(guān)系的加強(qiáng)產(chǎn)生了重大阻礙。

　　CNPC, which had already worked on smaller projects in Libya like pipeline construction and provided oilfield exploration services, was looking to make deeper inroads into the country. The Gadhafi regime pressured the Canadian company, which held oil production rights in the country’s Ghadames Basin, to instead sell to Libya’s sovereign wealth fund. European firms like Italy’s Eni SpA and France’s Total SA already had substantial operations in Libya, and the case added to mistrust between Beijing and Tripoli.

　　中石油之前在利比亞做過(guò)管道建設(shè)之類的一些小項(xiàng)目，并提供油田勘探服務(wù)。它本來(lái)是想在利比亞進(jìn)一步拓展。加拿大那家公司擁有利比亞古達(dá)米斯海灣(Ghadames Basin)的石油開采權(quán)，卡扎菲政權(quán)給它施加壓力，要求它不要把自己出售給中石油，而是出售給利比亞的主權(quán)財(cái)富基金。在此事加劇北京與的黎波里之間的不信任時(shí)，意大利埃尼公司(Eni SpA)、法國(guó)道達(dá)爾公司(Total SA)等歐洲公司在利比亞已經(jīng)開展了很多業(yè)務(wù)。

　　No doubt, Col. Gadhafi’s Libya grew in recent years to be an important trade partner with China China had more than $18 billion in deals and 35,000 citizens living in Libya when fighting broke out but at times they also appeared to be lukewarm friends.

　　沒錯(cuò)，卡扎菲治下的利比亞已經(jīng)在近幾年成為中國(guó)的一個(gè)重要貿(mào)易伙伴。戰(zhàn)事爆發(fā)的時(shí)候，中國(guó)在利比亞擁有超過(guò)180億美元的交易，3.5萬(wàn)名中國(guó)公民在利比亞生活。但兩國(guó)之間有些時(shí)候看上去也像是不冷不熱的朋友。

　　China appeared to support Col. Gadhafi as the rebel movement gained momentum. It’s struggling today to shore up relations with the opposition National Transitional Council as a result. The message Beijing seems to be sending: It would rather be seen supporting an on-again, off-again ally and standing firm to its foreign policy of nonintervention than support a movement that it fears could spread far beyond the Arab world.

　　在反對(duì)派運(yùn)動(dòng)形成勢(shì)頭時(shí)，中國(guó)似乎是支持卡扎菲的。所以，目前它與反對(duì)派全國(guó)過(guò)渡委員會(huì)(National Transitional Council)建立關(guān)系的過(guò)程似乎是遇到了困難。北京似乎是在發(fā)出這樣一個(gè)信息：它寧愿被人看成是支持一個(gè)反復(fù)無(wú)常的盟友，并堅(jiān)定奉行不干涉的外交政策，也不愿被看成是支持一場(chǎng)它擔(dān)心可能蔓延至阿拉伯世界以外的運(yùn)動(dòng)。