Last week, the Chinese government sent a delegation to Europe led by Lou Jiwei, the chairman of China’s sovereign wealth fund, to get a sense of just how bad things were and how much worse they might get. In the fancy hotel lobby lounges of Beijing, the whereabouts of senior Chinese officials such as Wang Qishan, the vice-premier of China, and the heads of the Chinese banks are the subject of constant speculation.

　　本月早些時(shí)候，中國(guó)政府派出了一個(gè)訪歐代表團(tuán)，由中國(guó)主權(quán)財(cái)富基金董事長(zhǎng)樓繼偉率隊(duì)，到實(shí)地去考察局勢(shì)究竟有多糟糕、以及還能糟糕到什么程度。在北京各豪華酒店的大堂休息室里，猜測(cè)一些中國(guó)高層官員（如國(guó)務(wù)院副總理王岐山，以及各中資銀行的頭頭們）的行蹤，成了人們不變的話題。

　　There are rumours that the Chinese have been buying Bunds and will make a fortune when (not if) Germany leaves the eurozone and reinstates sound Deutschmarks for the ill-fated euro. There are tales of desperate Italian and Spanish bankers offering stakes in their banks to possible buyers from the mainland as they plead for cash infusions.

　　有傳聞稱，中國(guó)一直在買進(jìn)德國(guó)國(guó)債，當(dāng)（不是“如果”）德國(guó)退出歐元區(qū)，拋棄倒霉的歐元、重新采用穩(wěn)健的德國(guó)馬克時(shí)，中國(guó)將會(huì)大賺一筆。還有人傳言，走投無(wú)路的意大利和西班牙銀行家在四處籌錢時(shí)，向來(lái)自中國(guó)內(nèi)地的潛在買家提議出讓自家銀行股權(quán)。

　　The US turned to the Chinese for rescue finance in 2007 and 2008. Now it is Europe’s turn to seek a slug of the $3,200bn in China’s coffers. The developed world is turning to the developing world for cash – which of course isn’t the way capital is supposed to flow.

　　2007-08年期間，美國(guó)請(qǐng)求中國(guó)出資紓困。如今則輪到歐洲請(qǐng)求中國(guó)從其3.2萬(wàn)億美元的金庫(kù)中拿出點(diǎn)零錢救急。發(fā)達(dá)世界請(qǐng)求發(fā)展中世界出錢——這顯然不是資本的合理流動(dòng)方向。

　　Capital is supposed to go to countries where growth is faster and productivity can be improved by capital investment. It isn’t supposed to go to more tired economies to support consumption from already overleveraged households and governments.

　　按理說(shuō)，資本應(yīng)當(dāng)流向經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)速度更快、生產(chǎn)率能夠通過(guò)資本投資得到提升的國(guó)家，而不應(yīng)當(dāng)流往疲態(tài)盡顯的經(jīng)濟(jì)體，用于支持本已負(fù)債累累的家庭和政府的消費(fèi)。

　　Still, in some ways, it is hardly surprising that the world is turning to China for financial aid. China has arguably been the biggest beneficiary of globalisation.

　　不過(guò)，從某些方面來(lái)說(shuō)，世界請(qǐng)求中國(guó)提供資助，也算不上令人驚訝，因?yàn)橹袊?guó)可謂是全球化的最大受益者。

　　When the rest of the world grows, China prospers. Every 1 percent of growth in the US translates into 5 percent growth in Chinese exports, according to data from JPMorgan.

　　當(dāng)世界其余地區(qū)在增長(zhǎng)時(shí)，中國(guó)在興旺發(fā)達(dá)。據(jù)摩根大通(JPMorgan)估算，美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)每增長(zhǎng)1%，中國(guó)的出口額就會(huì)相應(yīng)增長(zhǎng)5%。

　　Yet European hopes for Chinese cash may be dashed – at least in the near term.

　　然而，指望中國(guó)拿錢的歐洲恐怕要失望了——至少近期內(nèi)指望不上。

　　The glib explanation is that one lesson that Chinese officials have absorbed from the first chapter of the global financial crisis is that there is little upside in catching a falling sword.

　　一種簡(jiǎn)要的解釋是，中國(guó)官員已從全球金融危機(jī)的第一階段吸取了一個(gè)教訓(xùn)：接住一把下落的劍是沒(méi)什么好處的。

　　But another is that China’s agenda is still overwhelmingly domestic. It is much less bothered about the rest of the world than one might expect from the world’s second-largest economy.

　　還有一種解釋是，中國(guó)目前仍然把絕大部分精力放在國(guó)內(nèi)事務(wù)上。中國(guó)操心世界其他地區(qū)的程度，遠(yuǎn)低于人們對(duì)這個(gè)全球第二大經(jīng)濟(jì)體所抱有的希望。

　　It is natural for China to focus inwardly at a time when the country is outgrowing the model that brought the country so far so fast in recent years.

　　近年來(lái)推動(dòng)中國(guó)迅速發(fā)展的模式越來(lái)越不合時(shí)宜，在這種關(guān)頭，中國(guó)自然要把心思放在國(guó)內(nèi)事務(wù)上。

　　In some ways it is making progress as it tries to shift gears. It is becoming less reliant on exports (something that Japan never achieved). Wages are rising, helping the transformation into a domestic demand led economy. Income differentials between the eastern coast and the rest of the country are diminishing.

　　在某些方面，中國(guó)正在取得進(jìn)步，因?yàn)橹袊?guó)正努力“換檔”。中國(guó)正在不斷減少對(duì)出口的依賴（在這方面日本從未獲得成功）。工資持續(xù)上漲，有利于朝著內(nèi)需主導(dǎo)型經(jīng)濟(jì)的轉(zhuǎn)變。東部沿海與內(nèi)陸地區(qū)的收入差距不斷縮小。

　　Beijing has done a good job in slowing rising residential property prices (and calming the anger of its people who find housing increasingly unaffordable).

　　在遏制住宅價(jià)格上漲（以及化解越來(lái)越買不起房子的民眾的憤怒）方面，中國(guó)政府也做得不錯(cuò)。

　　But in other ways, progress has – if anything – gone into reverse, especially in dislodging the grip of the state-owned enterprises on the economy and the financial system. In other ways, though, China is less fair today than it was a few years ago. Inflation is part of the problem, especially when combined with the failure to dismantle other controls.

　　但在其他方面，中國(guó)非但沒(méi)有取得什么進(jìn)步，反而是在倒退，尤其是在減少國(guó)有企業(yè)對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)和金融體系的控制方面。還有，當(dāng)今中國(guó)比前些年更加不公平。通脹是問(wèn)題的一部分，而當(dāng)局未能廢除其他控制手段更是使情況雪上加霜。

　　Thus, for example, China’s workers get negative real rates of interest on their deposits because of controls on interest rates at a time when inflation remains at more than 6 per cent, while state owned enterprises get to borrow at artificially low rates.

　　比如說(shuō)，在通脹維持在6%以上的形勢(shì)下，由于當(dāng)局對(duì)利率的管控，中國(guó)勞動(dòng)者的存款只能得到實(shí)際利率為負(fù)的回報(bào)，而國(guó)有企業(yè)卻能以人為的低利率貸款。

　　In effect, that lets less wealthy households subsidise rich enterprises (which then go on to put the proceeds into the shadow banking system for far higher returns – and incidentally make serious money from their inappropriate financing activities).  

　　這實(shí)質(zhì)上等于讓不富裕的家庭補(bǔ)貼富裕的企業(yè)（后者轉(zhuǎn)身就把貸款投入到影子銀行體系，去獲取高得多的回報(bào)——偶爾還能從不正規(guī)的金融活動(dòng)中獲得高額收益）。

　　China is also becoming far less open. When, for example, HSBC was told to sell its stake in the Bank of Shanghai, it was explicitly informed it needed to sell to a Chinese buyer, a message that International Finance Corp, a unit of the World Bank, also received when it sold its minority stake in the same bank.

　　中國(guó)也正變得遠(yuǎn)不如以往開放。例如，當(dāng)有關(guān)部門要求匯豐(HSBC)出售其所持上海銀行(Bank of Shanghai)的股份時(shí)，它收到了一條明確的指示：必須賣給中國(guó)買家。世界銀行(World Bank)旗下的國(guó)際金融公司(International Finance Corp)在出售同一家銀行的少數(shù)股權(quán)時(shí)，也收到過(guò)同樣信息。

　　Partly, of course, China has learned that western capital is not stable capital. But regulatory interference in what should become market-driven processes has become more pervasive.

　　當(dāng)然，一方面中國(guó)已經(jīng)認(rèn)識(shí)到西方資本是變化無(wú)常的。但在另一方面，中國(guó)監(jiān)管部門對(duì)本應(yīng)由市場(chǎng)驅(qū)動(dòng)的過(guò)程橫加干預(yù)的現(xiàn)象，如今已經(jīng)變得更加無(wú)所不在。

　　The perception here in Beijing is that the world continues to treat China shabbily, despite all evidence to the contrary. What is startling to a visitor to this ever more prosperous capital is how little trust for the rest of the world has come with the prosperity. There is a sense that when foreigners make money in China, it is a zero sum game and that China itself is somehow diminished.

　　中國(guó)流行一種觀點(diǎn)，認(rèn)為世界仍在不公正地對(duì)待中國(guó)，盡管一切證據(jù)都說(shuō)明事實(shí)恰恰相反。造訪這個(gè)越來(lái)越繁榮的國(guó)度，你會(huì)驚訝地發(fā)現(xiàn)，在走向繁榮的同時(shí)，中國(guó)對(duì)世界其他地區(qū)的信任少得可憐。這里的人們覺(jué)得，當(dāng)外國(guó)人在中國(guó)賺到了錢，那就是一場(chǎng)“零和游戲”，中國(guó)自己多少就是吃虧的。

　　Much of China’s agenda is good but it won’t help the world nearly as much as the world hopes – at least not any time soon.

　　中國(guó)所關(guān)注的許多事務(wù)都無(wú)可厚非，但是，中國(guó)不會(huì)像世界所希望的那樣大力幫助世界——至少在短期內(nèi)不會(huì)。