China's investment in Blackstone shows how government investors are flourishing at the heart of the financial system

　　中國投資黑石是政府投資大戲的開始

　　WITH $1.2 trillion in foreign-exchange reserves and the pool growing by more than $1 billion every day, China casts a giant's shadow over the global financial markets, even if it has mostly used the money to pile up American Treasury bonds. The announcement on May 21st that it would invest $3 billion of its reserves in Blackstone, a New York-based private-equity firm soon to issue shares, shows that it is prepared to barge into murky private markets as well as liquid public ones. It is not the only inscrutable country to be cosying up to the inscrutable private-equity industry. Around the world, a secretive society is emerging of governments flush with foreign assets, some of them petrodollars, that are increasingly calling the shots in international finance. The Blackstone deal is likely to stir others to invest their money even farther away from prying eyes than they do already.

　　盡管中國通常,并且愈來愈多地購買美國債券，其1萬2千億并且以每天10億速度增長的外匯儲備給全球的金融市場帶來了巨大的陰影。中國將以其外匯儲備的30億美元投資于黑石公司，該公司是一家位于美國的私人股本公司，不久將發(fā)行股票。這一發(fā)布于5月21日的消息表明中國將準(zhǔn)備同時涉足隱秘的私人股權(quán)市場和高流通的公設(shè)市場。 神秘的中國偏好于神秘莫測的私人股權(quán)公司，這并不是唯一?？v觀全球，擁有巨額海外資產(chǎn)的政府悄然顯現(xiàn)，其資產(chǎn)一部分是石油美元，他們愈來愈多地操縱著國際金融市場。這次對黑石公司的交易很可能激起浪潮，使得資金投資更加遠離公眾的關(guān)注，比之于目前更甚。

　　Like China, whose proposed Blackstone stake is part of $300 billion that the government plans to set aside this year for investment purposes, dozens of countries have set up what are now commonly referred to as sovereign-wealth funds. They manage money drawn from reserves, natural-resource payments and the like. China is chiefly concerned to diversify its foreign reserves, but other sovereign-wealth funds own national, as well as international, assets.

　　中國計劃中的黑石股份的投資是其政府為投資目的而計劃預(yù)留的3千億美元的一部分，和中國一樣，十多個其它國家已經(jīng)建立起普遍稱之為的主權(quán)財富基金。他們管理著從外匯儲備，自然資源投資和其它類似的資源中抽取的資金。中國主要是關(guān)心其外匯儲備的多元化，而其它主權(quán)財富基金則同時擁有國有的和國際的資產(chǎn)。

　　The top 12 each have anything from $20 billion to hundreds of billions of dollars to invest (see table). Recently, Japan, Russia and India have reportedly been considering setting up funds along similar lines. Some estimates put the size of the funds at $2.5 trillion by the end of this year (in contrast, hedge funds are thought to have a mere $1.6 trillion), with another $450 billion in transfers from reserves being added annually. Including capital appreciation, the amount could swell to $12 trillion by 2015.

　　排名前12名的這些基金的投資從200億美元到幾千億美元不等（見表）。據(jù)報道，近來日本，俄羅斯和印度一直考慮按照同樣的路線建立基金。據(jù)估計到年底這些資金的規(guī)模將達到2萬5千億（而對沖基金據(jù)認(rèn)為只有1萬6千億），另外每年將增加從儲備資金轉(zhuǎn)移來的4500億美元。算上資本增值，該數(shù)量到2015年可能膨脹到12萬億美元。

　　To the extent governments have traditionally held investment assets, it was to protect domestic currencies and banks from crisis. Since the funds were for emergencies, they were of a type that could be liquidated easily—initially the holdings were in precious metals, lately they have been in dollars. The idea of building up an endowment to replace shrinking natural resources did not exist.

　　傳統(tǒng)上政府持有投資資產(chǎn)的最大目的是使其國內(nèi)貨幣和銀行免于金融危機的發(fā)生。由于這些基金是為應(yīng)付緊急事件而準(zhǔn)備的，他們投資的類型就是容易兌現(xiàn)-因此最初他們持有貴金屬，近來他們持有美元。建立基金以替代日益減少的自然資源，這樣的想法還不存在。

　　That process may have started inadvertently in 1956 when the British administration of the Gilbert Islands in Micronesia put a levy on the export of phosphates—bird manure—used in fertiliser. The manure has long since been depleted. However, a once-tiny set-aside of money has become the Kiribati Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund, a $520m investment portfolio that has grown to about nine times the tiny atoll's GDP.

　　這個過程在1956年本來可以自然開始的，那時在位于密克羅尼西亞的吉爾伯特群島上英國管理部門對出口用作肥料的磷酸鹽——鳥的糞肥——強制增稅。如今糞肥早已耗盡。然而，一次少許的資金存留逐漸成為基里巴斯的國家收入平均儲備基金。52億美元的投資組合已經(jīng)增長到大約是這個小小島國GDP的九倍。

　　A similar approach is now common among oil-producing countries, which, it is estimated, account for two-thirds of the assets in these sovereign-wealth funds, and are keen to diversify their national revenues, aware that their wealth is being pumped away. They have typically invested along similar lines to central banks, holding bonds, dollars and bank deposits. Temasek, a Singaporean entity created in 1974 to pool state-owned investments, started to change the mindset. It subsequently evolved into an even more complex investment vehicle. The heady combination of state-control, success and secrecy, entranced other governments.

　　在產(chǎn)油國同樣的方法普遍存在，據(jù)估計，這些國家占了主權(quán)財富基金總資產(chǎn)的三分之二，意識到他們的財富正在被抽離，因而急于使他們的國民收入投資多元化。 很有代表性地，他們同樣投資于中央銀行，持有債券，持有美元，同時持有銀行存款。創(chuàng)建于1974年，管理著國有資產(chǎn)投資的新加坡淡馬錫公司開始改變這樣的投資思維。并隨后發(fā)展成為一種更為復(fù)雜的投資手段。它把國家控股，成功，隱秘，機智有效的結(jié)合起來，因而對其它國家的政府極具吸引力。

　　Recently, central bankers have also begun wondering whether they have a fiduciary duty to make higher returns from the public wealth under their supervision, which could mean placing at least some part of foreign-exchange reserves in high-yielding, if less liquid, investments. In Asia this question has become increasingly pertinent in the past two years, as reserves have mushroomed.

　　近來，中央銀行的銀行家們也開始對之困惑，他們作為受托方是否有責(zé)任在他們的監(jiān)管下為其委托人從社會財富中謀取更高的回報，這可能意味著至少把一部分的外匯儲備用于低流通，但產(chǎn)出高的投資。在亞洲，隨著外匯儲備的迅速增加，這個問題變得愈加緊迫。

　　The result has been a torrent of money into a finite pool of assets. There is no precedent for such fortunes suddenly to find their way into global financial markets, and they help explain the waterfall of liquidity that has driven up the value of risky (and less risky) assets of all descriptions around the world. The world's entire supply of shares is $55 trillion, and bonds account for a similar amount. Sovereign-wealth funds could soon become the most important buyers of such assets, and many others besides. If so, the world will witness the intriguing spectacle of its largest private companies being owned by governments whose belief in capitalism is often partial.

　　其結(jié)果已經(jīng)演變?yōu)橛邢拶Y產(chǎn)市場中泛濫的資金洪流。像這樣大量的財富突然涌入全球的金融市場，還沒有先例。這是迅猛的流通性增長推高全球各種各樣風(fēng)險資產(chǎn)（和非風(fēng)險資產(chǎn)）價值的原因 。全世界全部的股票供應(yīng)量是55萬億美元，債券占有同樣的數(shù)量。主權(quán)財富基金不久有可能成為這些資產(chǎn)最重要的買家，包括許多其它資產(chǎn)。如果真是這樣的話，人們將見證這有趣的奇觀，其最大的私營企業(yè)為對資本主義半信半疑的一些政府所擁有。

　　The last time governments were this involved in sinking money into private assets, the process tended to be called nationalisation. Now the funds are invested both abroad and domestically. A new term will have to be coined: internationalisation, perhaps.

　　上次政府涉及在私有資產(chǎn)上花費金錢，其過程常常被稱之為國有化. 現(xiàn)在這些基金同時投資在國內(nèi)和國外。由此可能杜撰出新的名詞：國際擁有化。

　　Northern light

　　來自北方的曙光

　　Of the biggest sovereign funds, only Norway's provides anything close to transparency. Each year it discloses its investment portfolios and returns. Without such a window on their investments, it is hard to fathom the interests of other funds—how they vote on shareholder motions, for example. There are likely to be questions about strategic objectives, too. What will they care about most? Economic returns, political objectives, securing strategic resources? It will be hard to tell.

　　在所有最大的主權(quán)基金中，唯有挪威的基金更趨透明度。每年它都會披露其投資組合和盈利。如果其它基金沒有提供這樣一個披露其投資的窗口，很難弄清楚他們的偏好-比如，他們怎樣對股東提議進行表決。也可能存在關(guān)于戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)的問題。他們關(guān)心最多的是什么？經(jīng)濟收益，政治目標(biāo)，還是戰(zhàn)略資源的安全保障？都很難說。

　　Andrew Rozanov, of State Street Bank, argues that the lack of well-defined obligations and the ability to retain funds indefinitely while not having to reveal results is an investment advantage. The funds can harvest the benefits of volatility and illiquidity unavailable to the risk averse. It would not be surprising if some did particularly well. On the other hand, the same factors that could lead to higher returns could also lead to corruption and untoward political intervention.

　　State Street Bank銀行的Andrew Rozanov認(rèn)為，缺少規(guī)范的職責(zé)，能無限期的保持基金，同時不必透露其投資成效是這些基金投資的優(yōu)勢。這些基金能從市場的波動中以及因風(fēng)險規(guī)避而必然的高流通性中獲益，如果有些基金特別地成功，這并不稀奇。另一方面，導(dǎo)致更高回報的這些因素同樣也能產(chǎn)生腐敗以及有害的政治干預(yù)。

　　But the kind of assets the funds invest in—big ones—can generate frictions even when run properly. Temasek has been embroiled in controversy in Thailand after it bought Shin Corp, one of the country's telecoms companies, from Thaksin Shinawatra, the country's deposed prime minister. China is no stranger to such tensions. In an event that still rankles, CNOOC, the state-controlled oil company, was blocked in America, supposedly on national-security grounds from acquiring Unocal, an oil company. It is quite possible that by purchasing a non-voting interest in Blackstone, China will be able to bypass the restrictions that might prevent it doing Unocal-style deals in Europe and America.

　　主權(quán)基金投資的這種資產(chǎn)-特別是大型的-可能產(chǎn)生沖突，甚至運行良好時也會發(fā)生。淡馬錫公司由于從泰國前總理Thaksin Shinawatra手中購買了該國電信企業(yè)Shin Corp而卷入和泰國的爭吵中。中國對于此類緊張事件并不陌生。國家控股的石油公司中海油CNOOC因美國以國家安全為由的阻擊而未能成功收購美國石油公司優(yōu)尼科，這起事件的惡劣影響至今尤在。很有可能，中國這次通過購買黑石公司無投票權(quán)股權(quán)而繞過在歐美類似優(yōu)尼科事件中阻止其交易的限制。

　　By choosing a private-equity firm, China will also be able to invest directly in a partner that, notwithstanding its forthcoming share offering, can keep many of its operations out of the public eye. But this is where the ironies of the deal are most apparent. “Crony capitalism? It is a marriage made in heaven—a partnership that does not want investors to ask questions with a country whose firms do not want investors to ask questions. I worry about the serious conflicts of interest this generates. More generally, government entities shouldn't be in the business of investing in private firms,” opines Raghuram Rajan, of the University of Chicago's Graduate School of Business.

　　通過選擇私人股權(quán)公司，中國也能夠直接投資在合伙人方，他們可以使投資運作免于公眾的關(guān)注，盡管即將到來的股權(quán)交割眾所周知。而這也是此次交易最具諷刺意味的方面。芝加哥大學(xué)商業(yè)研究所的Raghuram Rajan說，“是裙帶資本主義嗎？真是絕佳的聯(lián)姻-和其公司投資者無權(quán)過問的國家進行的其投資者無權(quán)過問的合作。我擔(dān)心這會產(chǎn)生嚴(yán)重的利益沖突。一般來講，政府法人不應(yīng)該投資在私人公司。”

　　Moreover, it is widely believed that by having China as a partner, Blackstone will receive preferential access to China's market (as well as providing China with experience it clearly covets on how to set up its own domestic private-equity industry). This is an advantage for Blackstone, and for its shareholders, China included, particularly so when other private-equity firms complain that the impediments to operating in China are growing.

　　再者，據(jù)廣泛認(rèn)為，由于和中國合作，黑石集團能優(yōu)先進入中國的市場（同時為中國提供其明顯渴望得到的怎樣建立國內(nèi)私人股本企業(yè)的經(jīng)驗）。這對黑石集團，對其董事，包括中國在內(nèi)都有利。尤其是當(dāng)其它私人股本公司抱怨在中國操作的阻礙愈來愈大時。

　　However, providing an economic incentive to a lucky few, even if that includes the government itself, impedes China's broader need to create a fair and transparent financial market for all participants. That is what would produce the most efficient market for capital.

　　然而，為少數(shù)幸運者提供經(jīng)濟鼓勵，即使其中包括政府自己，也會阻止中國為所有參與者創(chuàng)建公平透明的金融市場的廣泛需求。而這樣的需求會產(chǎn)生高效運作的資本市場。

　　China still has vast holdings of state assets, and its embryonic stockmarket is bubbling over—if anything it needs more publicly traded companies. Like other countries with sovereign-wealth funds, it would appear to need more expertise in selling companies that it owns, rather than learning how to buy the ones it does not.

　　中國仍然擁有非常大量的國有資產(chǎn)，她新生的股票市場正在迅猛增長-如果她還需要什么的話，那就是更多的上市公司。正像其它擁有主權(quán)財富基金的國家一樣，中國似乎需要更多的專業(yè)技術(shù)使其公司上市出售，而不是學(xué)會怎樣購買她還沒有的公司。