While inflation dominated the news about last week’s National People’s Congress, a more interesting story may be the contentious internal debate about rebalancing Chinese growth from investment to consumption. It will prove a difficult task. The evolution of Chinese household consumption is one of the more striking economic stories of recent decades. In the 1980s household consumption comprised 50-52 per cent of China’s GDP – low, but within range of other high-saving Asian countries.

　　在有關(guān)上周中國人大會議的新聞報道中，通脹是焦點所在，但是，一場圍繞中國經(jīng)濟再平衡的內(nèi)部激辯或許會讓人們更感興趣。從“投資型增長”轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)?ldquo;消費型增長”將是一項艱巨的任務(wù)。中國家庭消費的演變是近幾十年最令人矚目的經(jīng)濟事件之一。上世紀80年代，家庭消費在中國GDP中占的比重為50-52%，屬于低水平，但尚在亞洲其他高儲蓄國家所處的范疇之內(nèi)。

　　Over the next decade as China’s economic growth outpaced consumption, household consumption declined slowly as a share of gross domestic product, to reach a worrying 46 per cent in 2000. Such a low share left rising investment and trade surpluses as the main engines of Chinese growth. Both rose rapidly during the next decade, generating growth of over 10 per cent annually.

　　在之后的十年內(nèi)，由于中國經(jīng)濟增速快于消費增速，家庭消費在GDP中的占比緩慢下降，到2000年降至令人擔憂的46%。不斷擴大的投資和貿(mào)易順差由此成為拉動中國經(jīng)濟增長的主要引擎。在接下來的十年內(nèi)，這兩個環(huán)節(jié)迅速擴張，推動中國經(jīng)濟年均增長10%以上。

　　In the next decade, however, thanks to the urgent need to repair China’s bankrupt banks, the divergence accelerated, and by 2005 consumption dropped to an unprecedented 40 per cent of GDP. Under Premier Wen Jiabao’s leadership Beijing resolved to rebalance the economy and increase the share of household consumption. But the low consumption share wasn’t an accident. It is fundamental to the growth model and cannot be reversed without abandoning the model. Not surprisingly, Beijing was unwilling to do so, and household consumption declined further over the rest of the decade to an astonishing 35 per cent of GDP.

　　然而，在接下來的十年內(nèi)，由于處于破產(chǎn)境地的中國各家銀行亟需救助，消費與投資和出口以更快的速度背道而馳。到2005年，消費的占比降至40%這一前所未有的最低水平。在溫家寶總理領(lǐng)導下，中國政府決心推動經(jīng)濟均衡增長，提高家庭消費在經(jīng)濟中的比重。但是，低消費并非偶然現(xiàn)象，而是現(xiàn)有增長模式的根本特征。不放棄現(xiàn)有模式，就無法改變低消費。果不其然，中國政府不愿意這么做。于是，接下來的5年里，家庭消費比重進一步下滑到35%，令人愕然。

　　China’s breakneck economic growth was fuelled by vast transfers of household wealth, which subsidised the manufacturing and investment boom and paid for bad loans. The most important of these transfers is the very low interest rate set by the central bank, which takes at least 5-7 per cent of GDP every year from households to give to banks and borrowers. Lower household wealth, of course, means lower household consumption.

　　中國經(jīng)濟的極速增長受到了大規(guī)模家庭財富轉(zhuǎn)移的推動。家庭財富的轉(zhuǎn)移為制造業(yè)和投資的繁榮提供了補貼，并為不良貸款埋單。其中最重要的因素是央行制定的極低利率。在低利率的作用下，每年從家庭轉(zhuǎn)移給銀行和貸款者的財富起碼占GDP的5-7%。家庭財富減少，自然導致家庭消費下降。

　　China’s investment-driven growth model is not unique. Many countries have used a version of this successful strategy, but all run into the same constraint. Rapidly expanding, politically directed investment tends to be misallocated. The losses are disguised, but not eliminated, by the huge hidden interest-rate subsidies.

　　投資驅(qū)動型的增長模式并非中國所獨有。許多國家都有過成功的先例，但也都遇到了同樣的困境。迅速擴張、受政府指導的投資往往存在配置不當?shù)膯栴}。所造成的損失會被巨額隱性利率補貼掩蓋起來，但不會因此消失。

　　China is no exception. It is misallocating capital on an unsustainable scale. So now Beijing must allow households to increase their share of the vast wealth generated in recent decades so that consumption, and not more investment, can be the next great driver of growth. But here’s the catch. Rebalancing requires that China reduce investment growth. The more bad investment China piles up, the more it must transfer wealth from households to keep those investments viable. But lower investment will cause a dramatic drop in economic growth. Accelerating investment is the only way policymakers can maintain high growth rates.

　　中國也不例外。中國資本錯配的規(guī)模之大已到了難以維系的地步。因此，現(xiàn)在中國政府必須允許家庭從近幾十年產(chǎn)生的巨額財富中獲得更大份額，使消費取代投資，成為未來經(jīng)濟增長的主要推動力。但這中間暗藏隱患。再平衡要求中國降低投資增速。不良投資累積越多，就必須從家庭轉(zhuǎn)移出越多財富，來維持那些投資。然而，投資減少勢必導致經(jīng)濟增長驟然放緩。加快投資步伐是政策制定者維持經(jīng)濟高增長的唯一途徑。

　　This is why the debate within China has become so contentious. Reformers argue that the transition to a more sustainable growth model requires reduced investment – and slower GDP growth. Their opponents, who are concentrated in sectors of the economy that benefited from the growth model, do not see the link between rapid growth and low consumption. They argue for administrative steps to improve consumption without decelerating investment.

　　這就是中國國內(nèi)這場爭論變得如此激烈的原因所在。改革派認為，要形成一種更可持續(xù)的增長模式，就必須減少投資，放慢經(jīng)濟增長步伐。反對者——主要集中在受益于現(xiàn)有增長模式的行業(yè)——則認為高增長和低消費之間不存在關(guān)聯(lián)。他們主張采取行政手段，在不導致投資減速的前提下擴大消費。

　　How quickly China resolves this debate is crucial. The historical precedents make it clear that once domestic imbalances are severe, the longer a country waits to adjust away from investment-driven growth, the more costly it is. But precedent also makes it clear how addictive the model can be. This is the challenge for China’s leadership. As long as investment grows quickly, it will require more subsidies from the household sector, and the household consumption share of GDP will stagnate. It is not until China makes the transition to a new growth model that rebalancing will begin.

　　中國何時能夠解決這場爭論至關(guān)重要。歷史先例表明，一旦國內(nèi)失衡達到嚴重程度，在改變投資驅(qū)動型增長模式方面拖延的時間越長，為此付出的代價就越大。但是，歷史先例也讓我們知道了，這種模式會讓人多么上癮。這正是中國領(lǐng)導層面臨的挑戰(zhàn)。只要投資還在迅速增長，就需要家庭部門提供更多補貼，家庭消費占GDP的比重就將停滯不前。只有在中國開始朝著新增長模式轉(zhuǎn)變以后，再平衡才會啟動。

　　The heated debate between the reformers, who are as unpopular as anyone who brings bad news tends to be, and those who see no reason to abandon a model that has generated such spectacular growth, has become one of the debates in the world. How quickly it is resolved will determine the pace and nature of China’s economic growth over the next several decades.

　　改革派（他們就像傳遞壞消息的信使一樣惹人討厭）和維護現(xiàn)有模式的陣營（他們認為沒必要放棄一種帶來如此高速增長的模式）之間的激烈辯論，已經(jīng)成為一場世界級辯論。這場辯論何時落下帷幕，將決定未來幾十年中國經(jīng)濟增長的速度和性質(zhì)。

　　The writer is a finance professor at Peking University and a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment .

　　本文作者系北京大學金融學教授、卡內(nèi)基基金會(Carnegie Endowment)高級研究員。