Inflation has the potential to become a serious economic and political problem in China. Not only does it raise living costs for ordinary people, it can also leave them earning negative returns on the very high level of savings (about 30 per cent of disposable income) in deposit accounts. That’s why it’s so important to assess just how high inflation will be this year, and how China’s political leaders will respond.

　　對中國而言，通脹有可能成為一個嚴重的經(jīng)濟與政治問題。通脹不僅會提高普通老百姓的生活成本，還有可能讓他們龐大的銀行儲蓄（約占可支配收入的30%）產(chǎn)生負收益。因此，評估今年通脹率會升至多高、以及中國政治領(lǐng)導人會如何應對，就變得十分重要。

　　In my view the problem is not very serious, and the policy response will be moderate. Yes, China will have to become accustomed to a slightly higher level of structural inflation in the coming years. But rapid growth in income and GDP means a crisis in the consumer price index is not looming.

　　在我看來，問題并不算太嚴重，而政策回應將會溫和有度。是的，未來幾年，中國不得不習慣于略高一些的結(jié)構(gòu)性通脹水平。但收入與國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)的快速增長意味著，“消費價格指數(shù)(CPI)危機”并非迫在眉睫。

　　The primary driver of CPI inflation in 2010 was bad weather, which led to a sharp fall in fresh vegetable and fruit supplies. As a result, food accounted for 74 percent of the 5.1 per cent year-on-year CPI rise last November. Fresh fruit and vegetables alone contributed almost one-quarter of all of China’s inflation in that month.

　　去年CPI上漲的主要原因是，惡劣天氣導致新鮮蔬果供應銳減。因此，11月CPI 5.1%的同比漲幅中，有74%由食品價格上漲貢獻。僅新鮮蔬果一類便貢獻了11月中國物價近四分之一的漲幅。

　　Better weather has already resulted in vegetable prices falling 17 percent from the early-November peak, and the government’s anti-inflation rhetoric has led some speculators to take profits and look elsewhere. The wholesale price of garlic – one of the few ‘durable’ vegetables subject to speculation – was up 131 percent year-on-year in October, but has since fallen 14 per cent. I expect food inflation to subside by early spring.

　　天氣的改善已使蔬菜價格較11月初的高點下跌了17%，而政府抗擊通脹的言論也讓一些投機客見好就收，將目光轉(zhuǎn)向其它領(lǐng)域。10月大蒜的批發(fā)價格同比上漲了131%，但自那時已累計下跌了14%。大蒜是少數(shù)幾種“可儲藏”蔬菜之一，因此易受投機客炒作。我預期，到早春時節(jié)，食品通脹便會消退。

　　The other major contributor to inflation in China has been the residence expenses component of the CPI basket. This does not include house prices, which are not part of the basket in almost all emerging markets, but it does include utility bills. Beijing’s decision to pass on more of the global increase in energy costs has raised these utility bills, and this accounted for 7 percent of the overall CPI rise last month. The higher cost of building and decoration materials contributed another 5 percent of the CPI increase, while rents added 2 percent.

　　中國通脹的另一個主要貢獻者是CPI籃子中的居住類開支。這一類別并不包括房價——在幾乎所有新興國家，CPI籃子中都不包括房價——但包括公用事業(yè)費用。全球能源成本上漲，中國政府決定將其中更多部分轉(zhuǎn)嫁給消費者，導致公用事業(yè)費用上漲，在11月CPI的整體漲幅中，這一部分占到了7%。建筑和裝修材料成本的上漲貢獻了CPI漲幅的5%，而租金貢獻了2%。

　　Combined, food and residence expenses accounted for 92 per cent of China’s inflation in November. Obviously, food and shelter costs are important, but it’s important to remember one point: rising wealth means Chinese consumers are better able to handle these increases than many of their Asian counterparts.

　　11月份，食品與居住類支出總共貢獻了中國通脹的92%。顯然，食品與居住成本很重要。但我們應該記住一點：隨著財富不斷增加，中國消費者應對此類價格上漲的能力要強于亞洲許多國家的消費者。

　　Inflation-adjusted income rose by 7 per cent or more in each of the last 10 years in China’s cities, and in each of the last five years in the countryside. The minimum wage has more than doubled since China joined the WTO in 2001.

　　過去10年，中國城鎮(zhèn)人口經(jīng)通脹調(diào)整的收入年增幅每年都達到7%或更高。而農(nóng)村人口的收入在過去5年也每年都實現(xiàn)了這個水平的增長。自2001年加入世貿(mào)組織(WTO)以來，中國最低工資水平已提高一倍以上。

　　Core CPI, which excludes food and energy prices, has been rising due in large part to greater demand stemming from the country’s rapidly increasing wealth. From 2006 to 2009, Core CPI averaged only 0.33 percent annually, while last year the average was 0.9 percent and in November it was 1.5 percent (see graph). But this higher level of structural inflation is not cause for alarm in an economy where nominal income growth will once again be in double-digits and GDP growth will be about 9.5 percent in 2011.

　　剔除食品與能源價格的核心通脹率(Core CPI)的上漲，在很大程度上要歸因于中國迅速累積的財富所帶來的需求增加。從2006年到2009年，年均核心通脹率只有0.33%，而去年的平均值達到了0.9%，11月的核心通脹率更是高達1.5%（見圖表）。但結(jié)構(gòu)性通脹率的上升并不足以引發(fā)擔憂，因為中國名義收入將再次出現(xiàn)兩位數(shù)的增長，而2011年的GDP增速也將達到9.5%左右。

　　Monetary policy has played a contributing role in the current CPI spike. As part of Beijing’s stimulus program, money supply (M2) growth jumped from 19 per cent in January 2009 to 29 percent in June of that year.

　　此番CPI快速上漲，貨幣政策也起到了推波助瀾的作用。作為中國政府刺激計劃的一部分，2009年6月的廣義貨幣供應量(M2)同比增幅從1月的19%躍升至29%。

　　But there are two reasons why inflation is not ‘always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon’, especially today in China. When Milton Friedman reached that conclusion over 40 years ago, he assumed that the velocity of money (the speed at which money changes hands to buy goods and services) would be constant. But in China the velocity of money fell sharply at the same time M2 rose, effectively neutralizing most of the increase in money supply.

　　但是，情況并不像米爾頓·弗里德曼(Milton Friedman)所說的“無論何時何地，通脹都是一種貨幣現(xiàn)象”，這句話尤其不適用于今日的中國。原因有二。40多年前弗里德曼(Milton Friedman)得出上述結(jié)論時，他假定貨幣流速（用于購買商品和服務的貨幣的易手速度）是一個常量。但在中國，在M2大幅增加的同時，貨幣流速卻急劇下降，有效中和了貨幣供應量的大部分增長。

　　A second factor is that significant overcapacity limits the ability of Chinese manufacturers to pass on higher input costs. In recent years, when raw material and energy costs have risen, margins have been squeezed while core CPI remained very low.

　　第二個原因是，嚴重的產(chǎn)能過剩限制了中國制造業(yè)企業(yè)把上升的投入成本轉(zhuǎn)嫁給消費者的能力。近年來，原材料與能源價格不斷上漲，制造業(yè)利潤受到嚴重擠壓，而核心通脹率依然極低。

　　All of this adds up to an inflation picture that is far from dangerous. Conquering inflation in 2011 does not require sharp tightening, just normalization of credit and liquidity back to the level of the years prior to the 2009 stimulus.

　　所有這些因素綜合起來，意味著當前的通脹形勢還遠遠未到危險的程度。2011年抗擊通脹不需要出臺大規(guī)模緊縮措施，而只需使信貸與流動性回落到2009年刺激計劃實施前的正常水平。

　　And that normalization is already well underway, with M2 growth falling from the 29 percent peak to 19.5 percent in November, and likely to return this year to the five-year pre-stimulus average of 16.7 percent (when CPI averaged 3.6 per cent).

　　而這個正?；^程早已啟動，去年11月的M2同比增幅已經(jīng)從2009年6月29%的峰值回落至19.5%，而且今年有望回落到刺激計劃實施前16.7%的5年平均水平（當時的年均CPI為3.6%）。

　　While I expect CPI growth to be moderate in 2011 (average 4-4.5 percent), high levels of liquidity and rising income are very likely to fuel price rises in China’s two main asset classes, equities and real estate.

　　我預計，今年CPI上漲將呈現(xiàn)溫和態(tài)勢（平均值在4%到4.5%之間），但高企的流動性水平與不斷增長的收入很可能會加劇中國兩大主要資產(chǎn)類別——股票與房地產(chǎn)——的價格上漲。

　　Beijing is likely to continue its current intervention in the housing market, but will also keep credit and liquidity high enough to support a healthy level of investment. Inflation will be conquered, but without a serious shock to China, or to the rest of the world.

　　中國政府很可能會維持目前對樓市的干預，但也會讓信貸與流動性維持在足以支撐健康投資水平的高位。通脹將被制服，但不會對中國或是世界其它地區(qū)形成嚴重沖擊。