Credit booms are often followed by credit busts. For those who don’t read history, this lesson has been learnt from painful recent experience. But not as far as China is concerned. The world’s second largest economy has seen a tremendous surge in lending over the past few years. The inevitable bad loans are already turning up. Yet the markets are not unduly concerned. While other countries suffer the ill consequences of reckless lending, China’s fate is different. Or, so we are told.

　　信貸繁榮之后通常會(huì)發(fā)生信貸泡沫破滅。對(duì)于那些不讀歷史的人來說，他們已從近期的痛苦經(jīng)歷中吸取了這一教訓(xùn)。但對(duì)中國(guó)來說卻沒有什么教訓(xùn)可以吸取。過去幾年里，這個(gè)世界第二大經(jīng)濟(jì)體發(fā)放了天量的貸款。不可避免的不良貸款正在顯現(xiàn)出來。然而，市場(chǎng)對(duì)此并未給予過分關(guān)注。盡管其它經(jīng)濟(jì)體嘗到了不計(jì)后果放貸的惡果，中國(guó)的命運(yùn)卻與它們有所不同?；蛘哒f，我們聽到的是這樣。

　　In 2009 and 2010, total credit grew respectively by 39 percent and 34 percent of GDP. At 160 percent of GDP, China’s stock of debt has climbed by 40 percentage points since early 2009. In a recent report, Credit Suisse economist Vincent Chan observes that Chinese credit growth has reached the critical level that has previously anticipated sudden downturns in other countries.* Non-bank credit instruments are also proliferating in China. A shift to this type of short-term funding is a typical indicator of rising financial fragility.

　　2009年，中國(guó)信貸總額增長(zhǎng)占到國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)的39%；2010年，這一比率為34%。自2009年初以來，中國(guó)債務(wù)總額攀升了40個(gè)百分點(diǎn)，達(dá)到GDP的160%。在最近的一份報(bào)告中，瑞信(Credit Suisse)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家陳昌華(Vincent Chan)表示，中國(guó)信貸增長(zhǎng)已達(dá)到臨界水平，這一水平以前在其它國(guó)家預(yù)示著突然低迷的來臨。中國(guó)非銀行信貸工具也在激增。轉(zhuǎn)向這種短期融資，是金融脆弱性加大的一個(gè)典型標(biāo)志。

　　Problems are appearing with loans to local government infrastructure projects, which constitute the bulk of the recent credit surge. Last month, a heavily indebted toll road operator in the south-western province of Yunnan announced it could not meet its repayment schedule. A port operator in Shanghai was reported to have illegally diverted working capital loans into real estate investments. Beijing’s Land Reserve, a levered vehicle that is used to fund public land purchases, apparently faces liquidity problems.

　　隨著銀行紛紛向地方政府基建項(xiàng)目發(fā)放貸款（這類貸款構(gòu)成了近年來借貸激增的主體），各種問題正在浮出水面。上個(gè)月，云南省一家負(fù)債沉重的收費(fèi)公路運(yùn)營(yíng)商宣布，它無法按既定計(jì)劃還款。據(jù)報(bào)，上海一家港口運(yùn)營(yíng)商非法使用流動(dòng)資金貸款進(jìn)行了房地產(chǎn)投資。北京的土地儲(chǔ)備貸款（一種用來為購(gòu)買公共土地籌措資金的杠桿式工具），明顯面臨著流動(dòng)性問題。

　　Nobody knows for sure how much debt these local government funding vehicles have taken on. The highest reported figure of Rmb14,000bn ($2,165bn) exceeds one-third of China’s GDP. Nobody knows how many of these loans will default. Moody’s has warned they may drive the banks’ non-performing loan ratio to 12 percent. In any other country, this would be a cause for concern. But not in China. Stephen Roach, a former chairman of Morgan Stanley’s Asian operations, typifies the prevailing sang-froid: “it doesn’t pay,” writes Mr Roach, “to diagnose the Chinese economy by drawing inferences from the experiences of others”.

　　沒有人清楚地知道，這些地方政府融資工具到底背負(fù)了多少債務(wù)？報(bào)道中出現(xiàn)的最大數(shù)字是14萬億元人民幣（合2.165萬億美元），超過中國(guó)GDP的三分之一。也沒有人知道，這些債務(wù)中有多少將會(huì)違約？穆迪(Moody's)已發(fā)出警告稱，這些債務(wù)可能會(huì)將中國(guó)銀行業(yè)的不良貸款率推升至12%。在幾乎任何國(guó)家，這都足以引起關(guān)切；但中國(guó)不在此列。摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)亞洲前董事長(zhǎng)史蒂芬·羅奇(Stephen Roach)，就是當(dāng)前占主流的這類鎮(zhèn)定人物的代表。他寫道，“參照其它國(guó)家的經(jīng)歷來推斷中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)，是毫無意義的”。

　　After all, China has experience with bad debts. At the turn of the century around 40 percent of Chinese bank loans were non-performing. Yet this mountain of bad loans did not portend an economic slowdown, undermine public finances or derail economic growth. In fact, over the following decade, China’s economy expanded rapidly. Its banks were cleaned up, listed on the world’s stock exchanges, and are today ranked among the world’s most valuable companies.

　　畢竟，中國(guó)有過遭遇壞賬的經(jīng)歷。在世紀(jì)之交，中國(guó)銀行業(yè)40%左右的貸款為不良貸款。但是，如此之高的不良貸款卻沒有引來經(jīng)濟(jì)下滑、妨礙公共財(cái)政或讓經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)偏離正軌。事實(shí)上，中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)在隨后十年里增長(zhǎng)迅猛。中國(guó)的銀行進(jìn)行了清理整頓，然后又在全球的證券交易所上市，目前則身處世界最具價(jià)值公司行列。

　　The story of how Beijing dealt with these bad debts is told in the book Red Capitalism by Carl Walter and Fraser Howie. Non-performing loans were taken from the banks at face value and handed over to government-controlled asset management companies, which in turn issued notes that were acquired by the same banks. The central bank indirectly used foreign exchange reserves to provide banks with new equity. Some bad loans were guaranteed by the Ministry of Finance and remained on the banks’ balance sheets as “restructuring receivables”.

　　卡爾·沃特(Carl Walter)和侯偉(Fraser Howie)合著的《紅色資本主義》(Red Capitalism)一書，講述了中國(guó)是如何處理上述壞賬的。不良貸款按其面值從銀行中剝離出來，轉(zhuǎn)移給政府控制的資產(chǎn)管理公司，然后資產(chǎn)管理公司發(fā)行債券，仍由這些銀行購(gòu)買。中國(guó)央行間接地使用外匯儲(chǔ)備向銀行注入新的股本。部分不良貸款得到了財(cái)政部的擔(dān)保，以“重組應(yīng)收款項(xiàng)”的名義保留在銀行的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表上。

　　By such acts of, what Mr Walter and Mr Howie aptly term, “financial legerdemain” China was able over a number of years to absorb bad debts equivalent to around a quarter of GDP. Depositors also contributed to the recapitalisation of the banking system. Deposit rates were kept artificially low, thus boosting the banks’ lending margins. Robust economic expansion did the rest.

　　通過這種被卡爾·沃特和侯偉貼切地稱為“財(cái)務(wù)戲法”的做法，中國(guó)得以在幾年之內(nèi)消化了相當(dāng)于GDP四分之一左右的壞賬。儲(chǔ)戶們也為銀行系統(tǒng)的資本重組做出了貢獻(xiàn)。存款利率被人為保持在低水平上，從而提升了銀行的貸款利潤(rùn)。其余的部分是靠強(qiáng)勁的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)解決的。

　　Most commentators believe that the non-performing loans generated by the recent credit boom will be handled with similar aplomb. Yet circumstances have changed. China’s credit system is more transparent than a decade ago. This could make Beijing’s financial boot-strapping more problematic. Bank depositors may also try to avoid footing the bill. Despite capital controls, it is increasingly easy for rich Chinese to move money offshore. The proliferation of high-yielding financial products provides an alternative to bank deposits for savers.

　　大多數(shù)評(píng)論人士認(rèn)為，近期信貸繁榮催生的不良貸款同樣會(huì)以這種從容不迫的方式加以解決。但是，環(huán)境已經(jīng)改變了。中國(guó)的信貸系統(tǒng)比十年之前更加透明。這或許會(huì)讓中國(guó)的財(cái)務(wù)自救變得更加困難。銀行儲(chǔ)戶可能也會(huì)盡力避免為此埋單。盡管政府實(shí)施資本管控，但中國(guó)富人將財(cái)富轉(zhuǎn)移到海外的難度仍變得越來越小。高收益金融產(chǎn)品的大量出現(xiàn)，則為儲(chǔ)戶提供了銀行存款以外的理財(cái)方式。

　　A decade ago, China’s economy had been restructured and enjoyed the benefits from accession to the World Trade Organisation. Exports and foreign direct investment were surging. The economy was spurred by a continuous flow of urban migrants and rising levels of fixed asset investment. These sources of growth have largely been expended. China can no longer expand its share of global trade without antagonising trading partners; migration from rural areas is slowing; and fixed asset investment at close to 50 per cent of GDP is far too high. The economy is also vulnerable to a collapse of the property bubble.

　　十年前，中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)進(jìn)行了重組，且因加入世貿(mào)組織(WTO)而受益匪淺。出口和外國(guó)直接投資(FDI)突飛猛進(jìn)。持續(xù)不斷的城市外來務(wù)工人員大潮和越來越高的固定資產(chǎn)投資水平推動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)向前發(fā)展。這些增長(zhǎng)源動(dòng)力現(xiàn)已基本消耗殆盡。中國(guó)若要擴(kuò)大在全球貿(mào)易中所占份額，必將激怒主要貿(mào)易伙伴；農(nóng)村向城市移民的趨勢(shì)已經(jīng)放緩；而固定資產(chǎn)投資已接近GDP的50%，高得離譜。中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)還面臨著房地產(chǎn)泡沫破裂的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

　　The Chinese authorities engineered a credit boom in 2009, believing they could sweep the resulting bad loans under the carpet as they had done in the past. But both China’s economy and debts are far larger today. It will be a challenge to pull off the same trick again.

　　2009年，中國(guó)當(dāng)局策劃了一場(chǎng)信貸繁榮，并且相信自己能像過去一樣，將由此造成的不良貸款隱藏到地毯之下。但是，中國(guó)今日的經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)模和債務(wù)規(guī)模都遠(yuǎn)大于以往。中國(guó)當(dāng)局要想施展同樣的“戲法”將面臨艱巨的挑戰(zhàn)。