On Monday, the Chinese government took an important step toward revealing the extent of borrowing by local governments. But full disclosure is still a long way off.

　　周一，中國政府朝著披露地方政府債務(wù)規(guī)模邁出了重要的一步。不過，遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)沒有達(dá)到全面披露的程度。

　　The National Audit Office released a report showing local government financing vehicle, or LGFV, debt at 4.97 trillion yuan ($768 billion), a figure that is much lower than previous government estimates and thus should be discounted. However, the NAO report also disclosed for the first time that non-LGFV local governmental debt totaled 5.7 trillion yuan at the end of 2010.

　　中國國家審計(jì)署公布的一份報(bào)告表明，地方政府融資平臺(tái)負(fù)債人民幣4.97萬億元（合7,680億美元），這個(gè)數(shù)字大大低于此前政府的估計(jì)，因此不能全信。不過，國家審計(jì)署的報(bào)告還首次披露說，截至2010年底，不包括地方政府融資平臺(tái)在內(nèi)的地方政府債務(wù)總額為人民幣5.7萬億元。

　　Combining the 5.7 trillion yuan in non-LGFV debt with previous China Banking Regulatory Commission and People's Bank of China estimates on LGFV loans outstanding, we arrive at total local governmental debt ranging between 15.4 trillion yuan and 20.1 trillion yuan, or 40% to 50% of China's 2010 GDP.

　　將上述5.7萬億元非地方政府融資平臺(tái)債務(wù)與此前中國銀監(jiān)會(huì)和中國央行估計(jì)的地方政府融資平臺(tái)未償貸款綜合在起來，我們得出的結(jié)論是地方政府債務(wù)為15.4萬億元至20.1萬億元，相當(dāng)于2010年中國國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)的40%-50%。

　　Important pieces of the local debt puzzle remain hidden, including local state-owned enterprise debt and the non-loan liabilities of LGFVs. Nevertheless, the recent government reports should be a wake-up call to Beijing that it urgently needs to address this issue.

　　地方政府債務(wù)“拼圖”的重要部分依然隱藏著，包括地方國有企業(yè)債務(wù)和地方政府融資平臺(tái)的非貸款債務(wù)。不過，政府最近的報(bào)告應(yīng)該給北京敲響了警鐘，說明這個(gè)問題的解決已刻不容緩。

　　That hasn't happened yet. Even as government audits begin to reveal the true scale of the problem, local governments across China continue to finance new construction projects. Because the central government has not made clear whether anyone would bear any serious costs for allowing the debt to grow, local governments have every incentive to continue their leveraging.

　　然而，北京尚未意識(shí)到問題的緊迫性。就在政府審計(jì)開始暴露出問題的真正規(guī)模之際，中國各地的地方政府卻在繼續(xù)為新的建設(shè)項(xiàng)目融資。由于中央政府一直沒有明確規(guī)定是否該有人對(duì)任由債務(wù)增長付出重大代價(jià)，地方政府毫無后顧之憂地繼續(xù)借貸。

　　In the absence of any obvious costs, local officials race against each other to borrow even more to finance grand projects before they rotate to new positions next year, while banks, which depend on new loans to illiquid borrowers to prevent old loans from becoming nonperforming, continue to pour credit into LGFV borrowers.

　　ZUMAPRESS.com中國青海的工人們正在鋪設(shè)鐵軌。在無需付出任何明顯代價(jià)的情況下，地方政府官員在下一年調(diào)任其他職務(wù)之前，爭(zhēng)相更多地爭(zhēng)取貸款來為大型項(xiàng)目提供資金，而銀行則是依靠向資金緊張的借款人發(fā)放新的貸款來防止原有貸款變成不良貸款，繼續(xù)向借款的地方政府融資平臺(tái)大量放貸。

　　China has been here before. In the 1980s and 1990s, determined technocrats in the central government, including Chen Yun, Yao Yilin and Zhu Rongji, acted decisively to impose steep costs on both local governments and the banks. In a maneuver called “cutting with one stroke,” central government officials ordered banks to stop credit expansion to all but a handful of investment projects. To prevent local governments from borrowing from informal banks, thousands of such banks were shut down.

　　中國過去也曾經(jīng)歷過這樣的問題。上世紀(jì)80年代和90年代，中央政府中堅(jiān)決的技術(shù)官員（包括陳云、姚依林和朱镕基）果決地令地方政府和銀行雙雙付出了高額的代價(jià)。按照所謂的“一刀切”的做法，中央政府官員下令銀行停止向大部分投資項(xiàng)目放貸，只有為數(shù)不多的項(xiàng)目例外。為防止地方政府從非正式的銀行借款，數(shù)千家非正式銀行被關(guān)閉。

　　Local officials saw promising projects turned into half-built skeletons, while banks saw spikes in nonperforming loans. As painful as “cutting with one stroke” was, it credibly showed local officials that they could no longer launch new projects without considering mounting debt. Banks also experienced the costly consequences of lending recklessly to local authorities.

　　地方政府官員眼看著充滿希望的項(xiàng)目變成了爛尾樓，而銀行則看著不良貸款大幅增加。盡管“一刀切”的后果慘重，卻使地方政府官員認(rèn)識(shí)到，不能在不考慮激增債務(wù)的情況下再推出新的項(xiàng)目。銀行也嘗到了一味地向地方政府放貸所帶來的苦果。

　　In essence, because financial institutions in a quasi-planned economy favored easy credit to state-owned borrowers, central technocrats periodically engineered credit crunches to remind everyone of the risks of too much leveraging in the system. Although somewhat awkward, it was very effective in controlling the size of leverage.

　　實(shí)際上，由于“準(zhǔn)計(jì)劃經(jīng)濟(jì)”中的金融機(jī)構(gòu)喜歡向國有企業(yè)隨便放貸，中央政府中的技術(shù)官員定期策劃信貸緊縮，以提醒人們經(jīng)濟(jì)中貸款過多的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。盡管這種方法有些笨拙，但對(duì)控制貸款規(guī)模卻非常有效。

　　Since China recognized a large pool of nonperforming loans in its banks in the late 1990s, however, we have not seen a sustained credit crunch engineered by the central government. In 2008, a credit crunch was in place until the global economic crisis led Beijing to release a deluge of credit into the economy. Local authorities rejoiced as banks lent out trillions in the space of a few months.

　　但是，自從中國在20世紀(jì)90年代晚期承認(rèn)銀行系統(tǒng)內(nèi)存在大量不良貸款以來，還沒有出現(xiàn)過一場(chǎng)由中央政府主導(dǎo)形成的持續(xù)信貸緊縮。2008年有過一場(chǎng)信貸緊縮，但全球經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)促使北京把洪水般的信貸注入經(jīng)濟(jì)體系。銀行在數(shù)月之內(nèi)貸出數(shù)萬億的資金，地方政府歡欣鼓舞。

　　The current debt level may be sustainable if the overall amount of debt stops growing. Yet, the latest estimates suggest that LGFV interest payments are at least 1 trillion yuan a year, and realistically more than 2 trillion yuan. Because most local governments run perennial deficits, they can only meet this payment by borrowing more from banks or investors or by imposing greater costs on households via land confiscation and fees.

　　如果債務(wù)總量不再擴(kuò)大，當(dāng)前的債務(wù)水平或許是可持續(xù)的。但從最新估計(jì)來看，地方政府融資平臺(tái)一年的付息成本至少有1萬億元，實(shí)際上應(yīng)該是在2萬億元以上。由于地方政府大多常年維持赤字，它們只有繼續(xù)從銀行或投資者手中借款，或通過征地、收費(fèi)而把更大財(cái)政負(fù)擔(dān)轉(zhuǎn)嫁到家庭身上，這樣才能償還這些利息。

　　Despite this mounting problem as well as inflationary pressures, the central government has not signaled to local authorities that they must stop borrowing. New CBRC regulations only force local governments to work with banks to restructure their debt. The fact that the NAO uncovered nearly 5 trillion yuan in LGFV loans, which the local government directly or indirectly underwrote, suggests that local governments in many cases have not complied with CBRC regulations forbidding direct governmental guarantees of LGFV loans. Few if any local officials have been removed as a consequence of violating these rules.

　　雖然存在日益嚴(yán)重的償債問題以及通脹壓力，中央政府并未向地方政府發(fā)出必須停止借款的信號(hào)。銀監(jiān)會(huì)新規(guī)只是強(qiáng)制地方政府會(huì)同銀行重組債務(wù)。審計(jì)署發(fā)現(xiàn)平臺(tái)貸款接近5萬億元，而這些貸款又是地方政府直接或間接擔(dān)保的，這說明地方政府在很多情況下并沒有遵守銀監(jiān)會(huì)禁止政府直接擔(dān)保平臺(tái)貸款的規(guī)定。因?yàn)檫`反這些規(guī)定而被免職的官員即使有，數(shù)量也是非常少的。

　　Even with some central bank efforts to restrict credit growth in recent months, central bankers are clearly under instruction not to cause any kind of credit crunch. When interbank rates rose too high in recent days, the central bank stopped issuing notes that would withdraw cash, so as to pump liquidity into the system. Banking regulators, which had issued a decree banning trust products based on loans to real estate developers, have not enforced this decree, leading to the rapid rise of products tied to real estate investment in recent months.

　　雖然央行在近幾個(gè)月采取了一些限制信貸增長的措施，但它明顯是接到了不要引起任何信貸緊縮的指示。近幾天銀行間利率過高時(shí)，央行停止發(fā)行回籠現(xiàn)金的票據(jù)，以便向銀行系統(tǒng)注入流動(dòng)性。銀行業(yè)監(jiān)管方曾經(jīng)發(fā)布禁令，不準(zhǔn)以借給房地產(chǎn)開發(fā)商的貸款為基礎(chǔ)推出信托產(chǎn)品，但這條禁令并未得到執(zhí)行，從而導(dǎo)致近幾個(gè)月與房地產(chǎn)投資掛鉤的信托產(chǎn)品迅猛增加。

　　At one point recently, credible rumors started circulating that Beijing was going to engineer a bailout of 2-3 trillion yuan for this local-government debt. This would have forced banks and the central government to share the costs of bailing out illiquid LGFVs. However, it turns out that Beijing did not have the resolve to carry out this limited plan. Worse, senior leaders have stated that money supply expansion has returned to its normal fast rate, signaling to banks and local governments alike that a new wave of credit expansion is at hand.

　　最近一段時(shí)間有可靠傳言說，北京將對(duì)地方政府平臺(tái)債務(wù)實(shí)施一輪2萬億到3萬億元的救助。如果真是這樣，銀行和中央政府就要分擔(dān)困難融資平臺(tái)的救助成本。但事實(shí)證明，北京沒有實(shí)施這種有限計(jì)劃的決心。更為嚴(yán)重的是，高層領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人已經(jīng)聲明說，貨幣供應(yīng)的增長已經(jīng)回歸正常的高水平，這等于是跟銀行和地方政府說，新一輪信貸擴(kuò)張即將開始。

　　Without any credible constraints against local borrowing, the local debt bubble will continue to grow, affecting an ever larger share of the economy. Meanwhile, debtors' ability to service debt continues to deteriorate because the same weak cash flow must cover the interest on a growing pile of debt. Although a credit crunch would be highly inconvenient before the 18th Party Congress next year, senior leaders in Beijing must find the resolve, as their predecessors had, to send a clear and costly signals to local officials that enough is enough.

　　如果不能可靠地約束地方的借款行為，那么地方債務(wù)泡沫就會(huì)繼續(xù)膨脹，影響到經(jīng)濟(jì)體中越來越大的部分。與此同時(shí)，債務(wù)人的償債能力繼續(xù)惡化，因?yàn)楝F(xiàn)金流仍像以前一樣微弱，而需要支付利息的債務(wù)卻越來越多。雖然在明年第18屆黨代會(huì)前夕發(fā)生信貸緊縮會(huì)非常麻煩，但北京的高層領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人必須像他們的前任一樣下定決心，向地方官員發(fā)出清晰的、有代價(jià)的信號(hào)：夠了。